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SISTEMA NACIONAL DE INOVAÇÃO: NOTAS 
SOBRE ASSIMETRIAS TECNOLOGICAS E 
PERSPECTIVAS DE CATCHING‑UP
ReSUMo: O que diferencia o Sistema Nacional de Inovação (SNI) de cada país? O 
SNI pode ser considerado um modelo analítico útil para explicar as performances eco‑
nômicas? Que tipo de representação pode suceder a “visão da política de indução” 
característica da abordagem do SNI? Tais questões são particularmente importantes 
para o entendimento dos possíveis resultados empíricos e analíticos dessa abordagem. 
Este trabalho discute as principais abordagens que explicam a convergência e a diver‑
gência tecnológica. Argumenta‑se que outro elemento identificado como a “dimensão 
institucional nacional” deve ser explicitamente levado em consideração para o enten‑
dimento das interrelações entre tecnologia, especialização e crescimento. Este trabalho 
também propõe uma macro‑representação do SNI que potencialmente captura e iden‑
tifica os níveis micro, meso e macro dos principais eixos que relacionam inovação, 
instituições, competências e performance econômica, além de fornecer um modelo 
gráfico simplificado sobre as relações entre o SNI, as competências e o crescimento 
econômico.
PALAVRAS‑CHAVe: Sistema Nacional de Inovação; tecnologia; competências; es‑
pecialização; crescimento.
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1. INTRODUCTION
What distinguishes the National Innovation System (NIS) across different countries? 
Could the NIS be considered a useful analytical framework to explain growth perfor‑
mances? Which kind of representation can supersede the “push policy view” of NIS 
approach? These questions are worthy of particular attention for the understanding of 
empirical and analytical potential achievements of this approach. 
First, I shall provide a summary view of the neo‑Schumpeterian approach and its 
main contributions to the understanding of technology as an important source for 
growth. In doing so, this approach introduces technological asymmetries between 
countries as a crucial aspect to explain trade, specialization, forging ahead, catching‑up 
and falling behind. 
Second, I shall suggest the hypothesis that the NIS could be considered as a useful 
proxy of institutional differences and support the idea of the increasing importance of 
“created assets” in the explanation of growth and specialization performances. The im‑
portance of the institutional dimension should come unsurprisingly, supported by gro‑
wing evidence from both micro and macro patterns of technological change. After all, at 
the micro level, technologies are to a fair extent incorporated into particular institutions, 
the firms, whose characteristics, decision rules, capabilities, and behavior are fundamen‑
tal to shaping the rates and directions of technological advance. However, although the 
NIS concept can be useful to capture differences across countries, a schematic representa‑
tion of the NIS and its interplay with the economic performances will be introduced ex‑
plicitly based on a longer essay by Cimoli and Della Giusta (1997). This macro‑represen‑
tation will allow for a comparative analysis of the “goodness” or “badness” of the NIS in 
terms of the main implication for specialization and economic performances, as different 
scenarios characterized by catching‑up, falling‑behind and forging ahead perspectives.  
Third, throughout this discussion it will be pinpointed that the interplay between 
the NIS and performances is not linear and a deterministic conclusion cannot be 
drawn. It will be particularly stressed that the nature of the interplay between the NIS 
and economic performances is also shaped, among others, by the historical events re‑
lated to industries and technological strategies, the specialization pattern, the cons‑
traints imposed by trade balance conditions and policies related to the macroecono‑
mic setting and exchange rate stabilization.
In the first section a discussion of the main approaches that explain technological 
divergence and convergence will be presented. In this context, it will be emphasized that 
another element identified as the “national institutional dimension” has to be explicitly 
taken into account for the understanding of the interplay that exists between techno‑
logy, specialization and growth. Section two is devoted to a macro‑representation of the 
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NIS which potentially captures and identifies at the micro, meso and macro levels the 
main threads that link innovation, institutions, competencies and economic performan‑
ces. Section three contains a simple graphical model of the interplay between the NIS, 
competencies and growth performances. In section four a brief conclusion is included. 
2. ASYMMETRIES IN TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH
Since the 1960’s, the central purpose of most contributions in the field of technology 
and trade has been to highlight the crucial importance of technological change and 
innovation in explaining the international trade pattern, e.g. Posner (1961), Freeman 
(1963), Hirsch (1965), Hufbauer (1966) and Vernon (1966). This approach has stres‑
sed international asymmetries in technology as the main determinant of trade flows 
and specialization patterns1. 
In Posner (1961), the initial asymmetric access to technological knowledge in a 
world characterized by similarities in demand patterns explains the pattern of trade. In 
this context, trade between countries will be maintained if differences in national abi‑
lities to innovate and imitate persist. After a lapse of time, most countries can imitate 
the new commodity and restore technological parity, also eliminating the basis for 
trade. Freeman (1963) and Hufbauer (1966) have stressed the differences in the factors 
which determine specialization before and after the imitation process takes place. 
Thus, during the innovation process the effects of patents, commercial secrecy, static 
and dynamic economies of scale prevail. However, once imitation occurs, specializa‑
tion will be determined by the traditional process of adjustment in production cost 
and competitiveness.
In Hirsch (1965) and Vernon (1966), technological asymmetries are associated to 
distinct phases in the evolution of a technology and a specific international distribu‑
tion of innovative capabilities in the production of new commodities. Innovative ad‑
vantage is the main feature of the initial phase, explaining the production of new com‑
modities in the advanced countries. Over time, technology evolves into a mature 
phase, characterized by the standardization of products and processes. In this latter 
phase, international competition is based on production cost advantages and techno‑
logy can be transferred to less developed economies, whose comparative advantage 
lies in their lower real wages. In this respect, the pattern of trade is considered a pro‑
1 In these approaches, technology is considered as a good that is not free, which provides an important 
advantage to the first innovator country.
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cess of technological divergence and convergence, in which the innovative process 
induces divergence while imitation and diffusion induce convergence between coun‑
tries2.
In doing so, many of these studies have undoubtedly scored points with policy 
makers who have increasingly come to recognize the significance of technology for 
international competitiveness. The theoretical basis of these contributions remains, 
however, poor. This is in fact not surprising. The introduction of “technology” in any 
kind of trade model, whether of the classical or the neo‑classical sort, raises many 
challenges. The complexity of the phenomenon of technological change on the one 
hand (with its dual impact on efficiency and new demand) and the essential dynamic 
“change” perspective implicit in the concept of technological change, on the other, are 
difficult to handle in their completeness in any kind of economic model.
The recent evolutionary formal approach puts increasing attention into uneven in‑
ternational technological change as an engine of growth with emphasis on the dynamics 
of specialization as in Metcalfe (1989), Metcalfe and Soete (1984), Amable (1992, 1993), 
Boggio (1993) and Soete and Verspagen (1992), and on the dynamics of catching‑up as 
analyzed in Verspagen (1990, 1991), Dosi and Freeman (1992) and Fagerberg (1995a).
In this context, the formal approach developed in Dosi and Soete (1983), Dosi, 
Pavitt and Soete (1990), Cimoli (1988), Cimoli and Soete (1992), Canter and Hanusch 
(1990) has pinpointed the importance of the interplay between absolute and compara‑
tive advantages as determinants of the participation of each country in world trade, the 
dominance of technological gaps in the process of international specialization, and the 
bounds imposed by the dynamics of innovation and trade on the “growth possibility 
sets” of each economy. On the determinants of absolute and comparative advantages, 
technological gaps – in terms of product and process innovation – and institutional 
asymmetries – in terms of the main form of organization of labour markets – contri‑
bute to determining the pattern of specialization and its evolution over time. On the 
demand side, on the other hand, asymmetries in national consumption patterns, re‑
garding price and income elasticities, play a crucial role on the interplay between spe‑
cialization and the macroeconomic level of activity. Finally, the trade balance condi‑
tion determines the growth rate differential of trading economies3.
2 A variety of models which capture the dynamics of specialization in term of substituting process between 
new and standard (old) commodities has been recently introduced; among others, see Krugman (1987) 
and Dollar (1986).
3 The main characteristics of this approach can be viewed not only in terms of modelling methodologies, 
but also in the ways in which some of the empirical properties of the world economy are considered. 
Thus, the structuralist/evolutionary approach has tried to account for what can be reasonably conside‑
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This approach has demonstrated that the growth of relative trading partners de‑
pends not only on the demand structure of each economy constrained by the condi‑
tions of the balance of payments, but also, particularly, on differences in technology. 
Furthermore, the technological gap is introduced as one of the main variables explai‑
ning the pattern of growth possibilities by means of the effect of what we will refer to 
here as the technological gap multiplier which accounts for the initial distance be‑
tween countries in terms of technological capabilities. 
Wide differences apply to the capabilities of developing new products and to diffe‑
rent time lags in producing them after they have been introduced into the world eco‑
nomy. Indeed, the international distribution of innovative capabilities regarding new 
products is at least as uneven as that regarding production processes. For example, if 
one takes international patents or the number of discrete innovations as a proxy for 
innovativeness, the evidence suggests that the club of innovators has been restricted 
over the whole past century to a dozen developed countries with only one major new 
entry, Japan. Second, the process of development and industrialization are strictly 
linked to the inter‑ and intra‑national diffusion of “superior” techniques. Accordingly, 
as already mentioned, at any point in time, there is likely to be only one or, at most, 
very few “best practice” techniques of production which correspond to the technolo‑
gical frontier. In the case of developing economies, the process of industrialization is 
thus closely linked to the borrowing, imitation and adaptation of established techno‑
logies from more advanced economies. These processes of adoption and adaptation of 
technologies, in turn, are influenced by the specific capabilities of each economy.
3. NIS‑COMPETENCIES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCES
Government intervention in the Latin American and the Pacific Rim newly industrialized 
economies (NIE) played an essential role in industrialization, but with opposite orienta‑
tions with respect to market orientation and specialization. The Latin American NIE have 
been characterized by production for domestic markets, whereas the Southeast Asian 
ones by export orientation and specialization in manufactured commodities. In the latter 
group of economies, a particular emphasis has been put into the promotion of linkages 
red as some fundamental properties affecting the interplay between trade and growth: a) the different 
commodities show a wide range of price and income elasticities; b) the rate of growth of each economy is 
normally constrained by the need to balance the foreign account; c) wage rates are mainly determined by 
institutional factors which account for the mechanism that relates wage and productivity over time; and 
d) the interplay between technical change, trade, and growth has to be interpreted as a mechanism that 
generates a tendency to converge to an equilibrium in the world rate of growth only as a particular case.
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across enterprises, often with the involvement of multinational enterprises (MNE) subsi‑
diaries, with the scope of promoting a stable access to technology transfer and a fruitful 
mode of diffusion into the whole economy. Another essential aspect in the development 
of these countries has been that of human capital formation; the role in industrial develo‑
pment of the scientific and educational system, in particular, has been repeatedly under‑
lined in the literature on the Asian NIE, where it has been often indicated as a fundamen‑
tal precondition to their success. On the whole, the general pattern of incentives defined 
by the existing institutions has accounted for the type of response to internal and external 
stimuli which have determined the relative success, and failure, of the NIE.
There is a significant body of literature explaining the importance of institutions and 
their role in economic and industrial development. In particular, regarding the Pacific 
Rim NIE, the works by Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), Cantwell (1991) and many others 
help understand not only how institutional success can exist, but also how institutional 
failure can too. Bardhan (1996) analyzes such issue as one of co‑ordination, which has to 
be seen in terms of the interaction of distributive conflicts with state capacity and gover‑
nance structure. The author suggests that the success of institutions in some NIE (namely 
South Korea and Taiwan) has to be understood in terms of the capacity of establishing 
and applying rules of performance criteria, so that, for example, credit allocation by the 
state was tightly bound with export performance; in this way, international competition 
was used to foster internal learning. Most of these approaches point out that growth is not 
automatic. Growth needs of a “social capability” which can be viewed as a 
[...] rubric that covers countries’ levels of general education and technical compe‑
tence, the commercial, industrial and financial institutions that bear on their ability 
to finance and operate modern, large‑scale business, and the political and social 
characteristics that influence the risks, the incentives and the personal rewards of 
economic activity including those rewards in social esteem that go beyond money 
and wealth. (Abramovitz, 1994)
These patterns provide examples of the functioning of what could be understood as 
a NIS4. Within this context, a variety of overlapped NIS concepts, with different emphasis 
at the firms, meso and macroeconomic levels, have been recently introduced (Edquist, 
1997). Think to the concepts introduced in Freeman (1987) and Nelson (1993), here 
within the national boundaries the attention is given to the analysis of a set of actors – 
firms and, particularly, other institutions such as universities, research organizations, etc 
4 Abramovitz’s notion of differentiated “social capabilities” is quite consistent with this view (Abramovitz, 
1989).
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– and the links between them in the innovation and diffusion processes. Metcalfe (1995) 
provides a policy‑oriented definition of National Innovation System as a “set of institu‑
tions which jointly and individually contribute to the development and diffusion of new 
technologies and which provides the framework within which governments form and 
implement policies to influence the innovation process”. He argues that the nature of each 
NIS is fundamentally shaped by both the division of labor and the peculiarities of infor‑
mation, which cause a predominance of co‑ordination by non‑market means. The insti‑
tutions that compose them (private firms, universities and other educational institutions, 
public research labs, private consultancies, professional societies, industrial research as‑
sociations) “make complementary contributions but they differ significantly with respect 
to motivation and to a commitment to dissemination of the knowledge they create” (ibi‑
dem). A more recent analysis referring specifically at the NIS approach in the NIE can be 
found in the works by Katz (1997), Kim (1997) and Lall (1997). The argument here put 
the emphasis on the “message” that growth and catching‑up potentiality are clearly rela‑
ted to country historical paths and development of a local NIS. Institutions, industrial 
and Science &Technology policies – as those that support science, human capital, com‑
petencies and learning capabilities – are the main variables introduced to explain diffe‑
rences between the NIS developed in both Latin American and Asian NIE.
The evolutionary foundations which account for the characteristics of national sys‑
tems of production and innovation develop through to the ideas that firms are repositories 
of knowledge, that they are nested in networks of linkages with other firms and also with 
other non‑profit organizations (networks which enhance the opportunities facing each 
firm to improve their problem‑solving capabilities), and finally that there exists a broader 
notion (at a wider level of aggregation) of embeddedness of microeconomic behaviors into 
a set of social relationships, rules and political constraints (Granovetter, 1985). 
Even at a properly micro level, the momentum associated with single technologi‑
cal trajectories is itself a largely social concept: “it points to the organizations and pe‑
ople committed by various interests to the system, to manufacturing corporations, 
research and development laboratories, investment banking houses, educational insti‑
tutions and regulatory bodies” (Misa, 1991, p. 15). And, in turn, these interests and 
institutions are sustained by the increasing return and local nature of most learning 
activities. Even more so, at a system level, the interpretation presented here is consis‑
tent, and indeed complementary, with institutional approaches building on the obser‑
vation that markets do not exist nor operate apart from the rules and institutions that 
establish them and that “the institutional structure of the economy creates a distinct 
pattern of constraints and incentives”, which defines the interests of the actors as well 
as shaping and channeling their behaviors (Zysman, 1994, p. 1‑2).
Nations are characterized by particular modes of institutional governance which 
to a certain extent make them diverse auto reproducing entities. Moreover, there exist 
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an element of nationality which is provided by the shared language and culture, and by 
the national focus of other policies, laws and regulations which condition the innova‑
tive environment (Metcalfe, 1995). Together, they contribute to shape the organizatio‑
nal and technological context within which each economic activity takes place. In a 
sense, they set the opportunities and constraints each individual process of production 
and innovation faces ‑ including the availability of complementary skills, information 
on intermediate inputs and capital goods, and demand stimuli to improve particular 
products. Institutional and technological diversities are seen in this context as the true 
determinants of development. The processes described here are in fact inherently 
co‑evolutionary (Nelson, 1992) in nature and therefore characterized by constant feed‑
back mechanisms. Such feedbacks take place essentially between performance and 
competency, but the role of the institutional strategies remains essential in the process.
In this section, I shall propose a concept and a representation of the NIS which 
empirically capture the main features that explain the technological asymmetries in‑
troduced above and some pieces of the case studies on the NIS. Moreover, by means of 
the systematization of this representation, two different attempts will be pursued. On 
the one hand, the major task of this interpretation will be the identification of an ag‑
gregate structure where the main threads that link technology, institutions, competen‑
cies and economic performances may be placed and described. On the other hand, an 
implication of this view is related to a broader set of approaches that look for a fra‑
mework where the mechanism that supports technical change and innovation could 
be understood, so that governments could form and implement policies in order to 
influence the innovation process (Cimoli and Della Giusta, 1997). 
In order to put together the components regarding the asymmetries in technology 
that have been developed so far, and therefore with a view to take a further step in the 
understanding of the process of technological change at institutional levels, I now pro‑
pose the idea of a set of technological capabilities (evolving in both time and space), 
defined by competence (that essentially refers to a firm’s, organization’s and country’s 
abilities to solve both technical and organizational problems) on the one side, and by 
performance (as measured by variables such as competitiveness, and contribution to 
industrial growth) on the other. In between those two entities, and shaping their inte‑
raction (and therefore causing the magnitude of the span that exists between the two) 
there lies the national innovation system, acting at both the national and regional 
levels and therefore possessing an inherently local nature (see Figure 1)5.
5 Other definition of national technological capabilities that captures the main features of learning and 
institutional setting is associated to a “[...] complex of skills, experience and conscious effort that enables 
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Source: Cimoli and Della Giusta (1997).
The hypothesis here is that differences in technological capabilities are a fruitful 
starting point for a theory that shows how technological gaps and national institutio‑
nal diversities can jointly reproduce themselves over rather long spans of time in ways 
that are easily compatible with the patterns of incentives and opportunities facing in‑
dividual agents, even when they turn out to be profoundly suboptimal from a collec‑
tive point of view. Conversely, in other circumstances, it might be precisely this insti‑
tutional and technological diversity among countries which may foster catching up 
(and, rarely leapfrogging) in innovative capabilities and per capita incomes. Rigorous 
demonstrations of these propositions would indeed require many intermediate steps, 
linking externalities and positive feedback mechanisms based on technological lear‑
ning with the institutional context in which microeconomic agents are embedded, and 
also the economic signals they face. Here let us just emphasize that systematically di‑
fferent rates of learning might have very little to do with “how well markets work”. 
Rather, incentives and opportunities which agents perceive in a particular context are 
themselves the result of particular histories of technologies and institutions.
a country’s enterprises to efficiently buy, use, adapt and improve and create technologies. The individual 
enterprise is the fundamental unit of technological activity, but national capability is larger than the sum 
of individual firm capability. It comprises the non‑market system of linkages, business culture and insti‑
tutions that enable firms to interact with each other, exchanging the information needed to co‑ordinate 
their activities and to undertake what effectively amounts to collective learning” (Lall, 1997).
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Moreover, by systematizing the difference between competence and performance, 
it could also become possible to create a concept of measurement of the “goodness” or 
“badness” of the NIS. The representation introduced above makes it possible to ex‑
plain why technological gaps among countries reproduce themselves over time due to 
the fact that individual behaviors (in response to the existing patterns of incentives and 
opportunities) produce suboptimal collective outcomes. In other words, the existence 
of diverse institutions and organizations and their modes of interaction determine 
specific national systems of innovation which over time present certain invariant cha‑
racteristics which account for their phases of relative “technological success and fai‑
lure” (Cimoli and Dosi, 1995). When organized appropriately, NIS are a powerful en‑
gine of progress; poorly organized and connected they may seriously inhibit the 
process of innovation (Metcalfe, 1995)6.
6 There also exists an international dimension given by MNE strategies that provokes slipover effects of 
technology policies of one nation on those of the others. Increasing mobility of firms’ resources (FDI, 
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In providing this tentative representation of the processes described above, we are 
aware of the oversimplification entailed by the implicit assumption that we are making; 
namely, that the vector of competencies and the matrix of NIS must be of compatible 
dimensions (i.e. to each component of competence should correspond a component of 
the NIS), and that there still exists the problem of defining and measuring such compo‑
nents. The latter, furthermore, is complicated by the presence of all those informal types 
of relationships between organizations and institutions (and among both sets of actors) 
that in standard literature fall under the heading of “externalities”. Clearly, further inves‑
tigation will be required in order to provide a more solid base to this representation of our 
structure. Nonetheless, we believe that the structure would provide a help in the unders‑
tanding of the mechanisms by which the NIS determine the success and failure of techno‑
logical progress, and therefore the positioning of the set of technological capabilities.
At a system level, there exist some macro‑level indicators of policy that, in our 
opinion, have to be viewed as both conditioning elements and results of the system’s 
performance (macro economic and regulatory settings, industrial and trade policies).
The matrix of the NIS is akin to the concept of “institutional matrix which sup‑
ports and sustains the activities of innovating firms” proposed by Metcalfe (1995), and 
although the representation is linear, one must keep in mind that this is so only for the 
sake of representation. In this framework, the possibility of institutional failures beco‑
mes incorporated into a broad structure which is able to account for the interactions 
among the main agents in the process of development. The essential feature of this 
system is constituted by the interface between capabilities and performance and the 
role that the NIS plays in it as the wider representative of institutions (both public and 
private). Knowledge flows are embodied into individuals and their organizations, as 
stated before, and therefore it is obvious that the central part in the system is played by 
a collection of institutions. Most countries are characterized by different type of insti‑
tutions which however could be distinguished according to how they contribute to the 
development of technologies and the role that they play in the whole system. Thus, one 
can think at the following institutions as a sort of representative sample of those actu‑
ally existing in different countries: higher education institutions (HEI), research & te‑
chnological development organizations (RTO), industrial research laboratories (IRL), 
strategic alliances, and so forth) and the globalization of the world economy can modify the main ele‑
ments that explain the origin and the orientation of the NIS‑competence, in terms of whether it is biased 
in favor of the MNE’s strategy or mainly determined by the country’s scientific and technology policy. 
On the other hand, the national unit is too large to understand the effects of the innovative process in a 
particular area: it becomes therefore important to focus on the appropriate unit of analysis, and therefore 
on distinct systems geographically and institutionally localized.
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government  research  institutes (GRI), military research institutes (MRI), agencies for 
education and training programmes (AET), certificated research and technology or‑
ganizations (CRTO), technological information centers (TIC), organizations suppor‑
ting science parks (OSSP), technology transfer‑institutions (TTI).
At a national level, competencies are clearly very difficult to be estimated and quan‑
tified. Thus, the country’s efforts to create these could be considered as proxies of the 
main competencies available in each economy7. Competencies can be identified as those 
which pertain to the following groups: educational (literacy rate, secondary and tertiary 
level enrolment ratios, third level students in math, science and engineering), R&D 
efforts (scientists and engineers in R&D, R&D in GNP, ratio of private and public R&D), 
technology transfer efforts (direct FDI stock, imports of capital goods). An essential as‑
pect of competencies regards its interplay with the catching up argument. In particular, 
when a country behind the world innovation frontier is considered, most of the compe‑
tencies variables could be considered as a support for the scope for imitation. Thus, by 
means of the representation introduced before catching‑up processes based on borro‑
wing, imitation and adaptation of established technologies from more advanced countries 
can be captured (Gomulka, 1971; Abramovitz, 1989; Maddison, 1991; Fagerberg, 1995a).
Economic performances depend on how each country implement policies (to stabi‑
lize the macroeconomic setting, to promote the industrial sectors) and organize its insti‑
tutional matrix and competencies. The relevant variables which can be considered as a 
proxy for the scope of catching‑up are: GDP per capita, rate of growth of GDP, exports as 
a percentage of GDP, productivity growth, technological sectoral distribution for GDP 
and exports in terms technological classification (Pavitt’s taxonomy or others), interna‑
tional market share of exports and imports and  employment in manufacturing sectors.
4. THE NIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR FORGING AHEAD, CATCHING‑UP AND FALLING BEHIND
By referring to the trade and growth analysis introduced before it is possible to draw 
an interpretation and a representation of the main interplay between the NIS and gro‑
wth performances8. 
7 “Competencies” here are used in a specific sense that captures those that are developed in the industrial 
sector (firms, institutions etc), incorporated in the human capital and specific institution dedicated to 
support innovative activities. The definition used here includes only the efforts addressed to innovative 
activities, while performances, in terms of export activities and growth, are viewed as the outcome of the 
above representation.  
8 The graphical model presented in this section has been adapted from Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990) and 
Cimoli (1994).
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Within the learning economics, the mechanisms of adoption and learning subs‑
tantially modify – and add new interpretations to – the cost functions faced by the 
sectoral country productivity. The description of the process proposed here explains 
how unit costs decrease in accordance to a technologically determined learning curve, 
with competencies clearly possessing a cumulative character9. This process has been 
adapted in the evolutionary‑structuralist models which introduced some sort of Ver‑
doorn‑Kaldor law for the explanation of the interplay between learning, dynamics of 
productivity and trade specialization10. The introduction of increasing returns in en‑
dogenous dynamics is displayed by a mechanism where explanation gains in speciali‑
zation in terms of an increase in exports and higher international market shares11.
In Figure 3, we provide a representation of the interplay that exists between pro‑
ductivity (p) and exports (z)12, where each schedule p‑z shows that changes in produc‑
9 It is extremely interesting to note how the existence of increasing returns to adoption is equally explained 
by the micro‑level process (Dosi, 1984).
10 A paradigm‑based theory of innovation and production seems to be highly consistent with the evidence 
on the patterned and cumulative nature of technical change and also with the evidence on microeco‑
nomic heterogeneity and technological gaps. Moreover, it directly links to those theories of production 
which allow for dynamic increasing returns from A. Young and Kaldor to the recent and more rigorous 
formalizations of path‑dependent models of innovation diffusion, whereby the interaction between mi‑
cro decisions and some form of learning or some externalities produces irreversible technological paths 
and lock‑in effects with respect to technologies which may well be inferior, on any welfare measure, to 
other national ones, but still happen to be dominant ‑ loosely speaking‑ because of the weight of their 
history (cf. the models by B. Arthur and P. David). However, paradigms are generally embodied in larger 
technological systems and in even larger economic‑wide systems of production and innovation. These 
evolutionary characteristics of the technical change process are seen in a complementary perspective as 
responsible for the occurrence of what has been called “lock‑in by historical events” (Arthur, 1989). This 
suggests a view of the process of selection and adoption of technologies dominated by path‑dependency, 
unpredictability, inflexibility (the more widespread the adoption of a particular technology is, the fewer 
the chances of another of being adopted are) and possible selection of inferior technologies (an example 
of the latter is the adoption of light‑water reactors instead of gas‑cooled reactors, which are now conside‑
red inferior). For example, Genthon (1995) discusses at length the failure of piecemeal national champion 
European policies, a failure that presents some sort of similarity with the dramatic failure of such major 
attempts to build an independent computer industry as those of Brazil and India at the dawn of the per‑
sonal computing era (Delapierre and Zimmermann, 1986; Gaio, 1990). Several implications are derived 
from this (those concerning the catching‑up by developing countries are especially interesting), among 
which the fact that the history of a firm (in terms of the techniques it is and was able to master), sector 
and institutions are very important in determining its current choices of technique and that phenomena 
of path‑dependency and lock‑in by historical events would emerge. 
11 All this is to reconsider dynamic comparative advantages as a useful principle for the explanation of trade 
performance and, particularly, a dynamics comparative advantages principle based mainly on “learning 
dynamics” and not exclusively on the differences in terms of “natural” assets (oil, coffee, labor, etc) and 
“created” ones (NIS‑competences).
12 In this respect, p is considered as the average labor productivity in the industrial sectors. However, this 
analysis could be extended to a reconsideration of capital inputs, see Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990).   
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tivity are leaded by exports increasing. Thus, under the assumptions that a change in 
productivity will affect the whole range of commodities produced13, an increase in the 
country’s exports – higher participation in the world economy and market shares for 
the commodities already exported – will lead to a higher productivity via learning 
mechanisms, organizational change and quality improvements14. 




= (NIS, Competences, z)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Cimoli, Dosi and Soete (1986) and Krugman (1987).
By referring to these relationships different schedules of specialization and produc‑
tivity can be obtained. In Figure 3, an increase in domestic competencies – literacy rate, 
secondary and tertiary level enrolment ratios, third level students in math, science and 
engineering, scientists and engineers in R&D, R&D in GNP (private and public R&D), 
direct FDI stock, imports of capital goods, etc – moves the function to the right side 
and will increase the number and type of commodities exported. In the high NIS‑com‑
petencies area, the number of commodities produced and exported will be increased 
(new international markets could be gained for “new” commodities that have been al‑
ready imported or produced only for the local market). Two simple and schematic 
13 In this case that a similar consumption pattern prevails and production costs are given and fixed in both 
economies.
14 This figure is obtained from a model with a continuum of goods where the dynamic increasing returns 
are introduced, as in Cimoli, Dosi and Soete (1986) and Krugman (1987).
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processes are here described. First, a country can obtain gains in terms of dynamic 
comparative advantages when a path of productivity growth is taking place. General 
support could be found, among others, in the learning mechanisms, production orga‑
nization and product quality improvements. Second, a country’s efforts to increase its 
participation with “new” commodities in the world market are mainly embodied in the 
changes in NIS‑competencies addressed to support innovation and its diffusion.
Figure 4 – NIS‑competencies and trade growth performances: forging‑ahead, 
catching up and falling‑behind


















In Figure 4, the interplay between NIS‑competencies and the catching up process 
is graphically represented. Looking at the left side, one can think of a “NIS‑competen‑
cies frontier” which could be identified as the actual created asset that each economy 
has shown to build‑up in order to support innovation and its diffusion15. Each p‑y 
schedule is build‑up on a given NIS‑competence. The figure tells us that an increase in 
15 From this point of view it clearly results that the NIS‑competence assets is gaining an increasing impor‑
tance in the explanation of comparative advantages and competitiveness. In a sense, it can be argued 
that the actual scenario seems to indicate that in an international context the importance of the “created 
assets” represented by the interplay between the NSI and the competences described before is growing 
(created versus natural assets).
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domestic productivity will lead to a higher domestic income (with respect the world 
economy). In other words, an export‑led growth approach is here assumed16. 
On the right side of the figure, the growth trajectories are displayed (whereas y 
approximates the GDP as a proxy for the scope for catching‑up). The export‑led gro‑
wth process is taking place on a single schedule relating y changes over time. Thus, if 
our country is behind the international frontier, a process of catching‑up is taking 
place when its productivity increase and learning mechanisms (associated to organiza‑
tional changes, improved adaptation of imported capital goods and quality improve‑
ments, etc) in the production activities are obtained17. Two limits are represented when 
the catching‑up path takes place, (Y)1 and (Y)2, which could be considered as physio‑
logical bottom‑up of relative growth possibilities; in particular, y1 represents the “in‑
ternational frontier” capturing the performance attained by the developed economies. 
Again, on the left side, a successful effort to increase this NIS‑competence asset 
would shift the schedule p‑y upward. The same could be obtained when the set of 
institutions, which jointly and individually contribute to the development and diffu‑
sion of new technologies, improves the transfer and absorption capacity of knowledge 
flow and, consequently, the diffusion of the innovation process. Thus, an effort to in‑
crease NIS‑competencies and improve their functionality would produce a jump of 
the schedule y‑t reducing the gap from the international frontier.  
In other words, a stronger effort to obtain a functional (well organized) NIS and 
higher competencies will lead to an upward shift in the schedules p‑y and y (the in‑
come increase from ya to yc). Thus, a higher participation and higher income with 
respect to the world economy could be reached; and a process of catching‑up is taking 
place, reducing the growth gap in relation to the international frontier.
Most of the effects described before can be neutralized by a higher effort to incre‑
ase the NIS‑competence asset and improve its organization in the advanced countries. 
In this case, a jump of the international frontier (y1) and an increasing gap in relation 
to the others growth trajectories could be obtained. A scenario of stable gap in the 
16 The size of the domestic market appears to be another crucial competitive factor. In a sense, it can be 
suggested that countries with a small domestic market are characterized by lower capabilities to develop 
economies of scale and technological spillovers. The domestic market and its size may have important 
implication when an effort in NIS‑competences is made. In a sense, this effort can be neutralized if the 
economy has not yet reached the economies of scale required to support and gain in terms of internatio‑
nal competitiveness. Moreover, if a larger country does a greater effort in NIS‑competences, the lower 
cost of innovative activity and larger spillovers could explain international advantages. See Fagerberg 
(1995b).
17 In this context, the introduction of dynamics increasing returns is assumed to explain the interplay be‑
tween productivity and income.
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growth trajectories in terms of the international frontier could be viewed as the result 
of similar efforts in NSI‑competencies.
The catching‑up process introduced here puts its emphasis on differences in the 
scope of export‑led growth and a country’s potentiality to support the innovation sys‑
tem18. In this sense, there are two mechanisms being introduced and described in Fi‑
gure 4. First, a country could exploit growing productivity on the basis of improved 
competitiveness and increased exports. This process is building‑up on a given 
NIS‑competency framework. Thus, learning mechanisms, organizational changes and 
quality improvements in production are the main sources of catching‑up. Second, it 
can be stated that, since the catching‑up process is shaped by the actual NIS‑compe‑
tencies, an effort to increase this asset and improve its functionality would make the 
country’s growth trajectory jump near the international frontier. 
The model sketched before accounts in a relatively straightforward manner for the 
following general property: that all efforts addressed to improve the functionality of 
the NIS‑competencies – related to both institutions and resources – by a country could 
be viewed as a necessary condition to improve its economic performance. In the same 
sense one can see that a catching‑up (or forging‑ahead) growth trajectory is taking 
place. Conversely, a falling‑behind trajectory is associated with a NIS‑competence po‑
orly organized and lower efforts to increase this asset. 
Few examples of how the system functions are provided by the historical case studies 
discussed by Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990), showing the mechanisms through which the 
NIS, by fostering R&D, has been enhancing the competencies of firms and industries, 
finally inducing an improvement in performances. The same type of relationship is also 
confirmed by the case studies recently conducted by OECD, that revealed the extent and 
types of collaborations between enterprises and the public sector research base (formal 
collaborations – such as commissioned research, joint R&D projects, co‑patenting and 
co‑publications –, informal transaction – informal contacts and use of published scien‑
tific knowledge –, spin‑offs from universities, and transfer of technology to enterprises 
– patents and product developments). At a more specific level, and in particular by focu‑
sing on the educational policy, another example of the relationship running through the 
NIS to enhanced competence and better performance is provided by the analysis of the 
Taiwanese experience supplied by Nelson (1993) and Della Giusta (1996).
In Germany, Japan and Sweden it has been often observed that, at least in most of 
the post‑war period, the education and training systems have been particularly effi‑
18 Most of the works on catching‑up put the emphasis on the scope for imitation (Gomulka, 1971; Abra‑
movitz, 1979, 1994; and Maddison, 1991). The scope for imitation here is considered as a feature of both 
competitiveness ‑ organizational and quality improvements – and NIS‑competence efforts. 
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cient in providing people with the requested standards in terms of knowledge and 
skills. University and government laboratories can therefore be considered as an im‑
portant source for technological capabilities for the firms. In this respect, one can also 
mention the cases of Korea and Taiwan, emerging countries where it seems that edu‑
cation‑led growth has contributed to shift international specialization from standard 
product to much more sophisticated ones, gradually characterized by a higher content 
of technological complexity. 
In other words, a specialization increasingly oriented towards innovative commo‑
dities has been often supported and associated, particularly to the successful story ca‑
ses, by long‑term planning initiatives and public investments in “human capital”. 
While, as a counterfactual example, in the case of Argentine and Brazil it seems that 
the weak links between the science and education systems and the industrial and R&D 
systems contribute to explain their weak competitive performances. This institutional 
supportive environment reduces at least in part the serious analytical and empirical 
difficulties that scholars have faced in explaining within an incremental perspective 
the incredibly fast technological learning trajectories experienced by some Far Eastern 
firms (Freeman, 1987; Amsden, 1989; Canuto, 1994; Hobday, 1995).
Moreover, taking this analysis to its logical extreme, one might say that the inter‑
national performance can be obtained only according to the differences in the 
NIS‑competence displayed in each economy. Thus, international competition could be 
based on a “protected piece of the NIS‑competencies”, or on industries supported by 
government policies in terms of resources for the development of science and techno‑
logy. That has been the case for Korean chaebols, as well as of the American computer, 
software and semiconductor industries, supported by research resources from the De‑
partment of Defense (Nelson, 1993; Genthon, 1995).
However, in this context, as it happens when one refers to the explanation of the 
interplay between science and innovation, even the relationship between NIS‑compe‑
tence and performance is neither linear nor deterministic in character. 
In particular, when one thinks of other variables and relationships captured in the 
interplay between the specialization pattern and constraints imposed by trade balance 
conditions, the policies related to the macroeconomic setting and the exchange rate, 
some of the results presented herein could be modified and produce paradoxical scena‑
rios19.  Putting this observation into the above picture, one can identify different cases. 
19 To some extent this approach has to be resembled introducing the kind of results obtained in the tra‑
de‑growth analysis (from others, Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 1990; Cimoli and Soete, 1992; Cimoli, 1994; 
Fagerberg, 1988, 1995a).
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For example, on the grounds of this context, the interplay that exists between dynamic 
endogenous changes of comparative advantages and national consumption patterns for 
the determination of differences in relative incomes and growth possibilities has been 
explicitly emphasized. National consumption patterns are determined by a mix average 
of income and price elasticities for a pattern of endogenously‑determined specialization 
which are explicitly related to the constraints resulting from the external account. 
By explicitly incorporating this analysis, a paradoxical result can be obtained asso‑
ciated to the perspective of falling behind or forging ahead as the technological lear‑
ning and accumulation for the sectoral activities interact with the national consump‑
tion patterns, which are asymmetrical at a national level20. Think at the cases where 
specialization is mainly oriented to those sectors characterized by higher or lower rates 
of growth in world exports. Moreover, and as emphasized in much of the trade and 
development literature, the effect of the asymmetry on import demand is associated 
with the “type” and the income elasticities of the commodities produced and exported 
in both countries (one may think here of the case of primary and manufactured com‑
modities or the different income elasticities associated to low and high tech products).
If a country shows high dynamics of increasing returns and learning capabilities in 
the sectors where the consumption pattern is not favorable, it may result in a process 
of falling behind. In the case of low dynamics of increasing returns and a favorable 
consumption pattern, a country may find a process of catching up or forging ahead. 
Thus, the possibility of forging ahead and catching‑up are guaranteed when the lear‑
ning capabilities are distributed in those activities associated to a favorable world con‑
sumption pattern. 
In so far as distribution (changes in wages and productivities and wage‑labor ne‑
xus prevailing in each economy) has also an impact on the trade performance, most of 
the NIS effect described above can be neutralized. Take an extreme analysis that in 
each country an oligopolistic (where the wage‑labor nexus is characterized by tacit or 
statutory mechanisms of strong indexation of wages to labor productivity) or a classi‑
cal form of regulation (where the wage‑labor nexus is determined by a weak indexa‑
tion of wage to productivity) prevails. Of course, in practice, these are two extreme 
archetypes, but most of the effects described above on the NIS‑competence can be 
neutralized by the interaction of different dynamics in distribution variables which 
20 Thus, sectoral distribution of specialization can determine a divergence between the production and 
consumption pattern at national level. In this context, as introduced in Pasinetti (1981), the asymmetry 
in the domestic and foreign consumption patterns is considered a key element in the explanation of the 
convergence versus divergence in the output rate of growth.
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could move in favor or to the detriment of the domestic country21. What emerges, in 
other words, is that the traditional income growth effects due to relative changes in 
prices and wages and differences in the demand structure are not so clear (let alone 
obvious). Thus this situation can clearly lead to situations where the celebrated case of 
immiserizing growth and Prebisch‑Singer thesis could prevail.
Another aspect that could clearly neutralize the effects of NIS‑competencies rela‑
tes to the cases where the macroeconomic setting is characterized by the high instabi‑
lity frequently emerging from the vicious circle of depreciation‑appreciation of the 
exchange rate. This scenario characterizes most of the semi‑industrialized economies 
in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico), and, particularly, the main econo‑
mic actors involved in the process of acquisition and diffusion of innovation do not 
take any decision involving a long term perspective because their strategies are take 
care, wait and see how the exchange rate will move. In a sense, efforts oriented to the 
increasing on NIS‑competencies could be neutralized by a macro‑setting characteri‑
zed by high instability. 
However, when a stable macroeconomic setting prevails, the delinking of the ex‑
change rate from the real economy (trade and specialization) is concerned with the 
existing differences in NIS‑competencies and its evolution over time. A high delinking 
is related to large differences in the NIS‑competence. A similar case emerges when 
dedicated efforts arise in the leader innovating countries and a process of forging 
ahead or falling behind is taking place; conversely, a large sensitivity occurs when 
countries are characterized by small differences in this created asset and a process of 
catching‑up is resulting. In a sense, what paradoxically takes place is that the actual 
effects of the exchange rate on trade flows and specialization are closely linked, given 
a stable macroeconomic setting, to the differences in NIS‑competence assets. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to discuss the empirical and analytical features that  su‑
pport NIS analysis for the understanding of its implication on the sources of  technolo‑
gical asymmetries and growth, which show different performances across countries. 
The importance of the institutional dimension for the understanding of technolo‑
gical asymmetries should come as no surprise, supported by growing evidence from 
21 These empirical archetypes of the institutions governing the labor market are extensively analyzed in the 
theory of regulation developed in Boyer (1988a, 1988b).
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the neo‑Schumpeterian trade and growth approaches. After all, at the micro level, te‑
chnologies are to a fair extent incorporated into particular institutions, the firms, 
whose characteristics, decision rules, capabilities, and behaviors are fundamental to 
shaping the rates and directions of technological advance. In turn, firms are embedded 
in rich networks of relations with each other and with other institutional actors – ran‑
ging from government agencies to universities etc. Moreover, a major element linking 
microeconomic learning with national patterns of development is the embeddedness 
of the thread of incentives, constraints, and types of corporate organization into the 
broader institutional framework of the political economy of each country. 
The NIS could be considered as a useful concept that captures the countries asym‑
metries in institutions, linkages, sectoral patterns of diffusion and production of inno‑
vation. Moreover, we would like to push this point to a more economic view of the NIS 
where the linkages with country’s growth performances should be internalized. Two 
are the main reasons supporting this view.
First, we asserted that the NIS view could increase its significance when its mea‑
ningful will is addressed to recover some economic patterns regarding specificities of 
the economies interested in a catching‑up process. Examples, among others, include 
the strategies to promote industrialization (export‑led growth versus inward‑oriented 
strategies) and technological capabilities (building‑up a consistent NIS with increasing 
effort to improve its functionality), the main features of macroeconomic setting, the 
exchange rate policy and the actual specialization. Moreover, export‑led growth me‑
chanisms, based on learning and organizational changes in the production activities, 
and stronger effort to obtain a functional (well organized) NIS and higher competen‑
cies will lead to an upward shift of the growth trajectory and a catching‑up process. 
Second, the emphasis on the NIS and its interplay with trade‑growth approaches 
tends to up‑play the understanding that can be made around further empirical works 
and appreciative theorizing on this topic. Going back to the particular type of NIS re‑
presentation introduced here, it is very important to underline that this representation 
is oriented to capture the functional relationships among variables, and it is essentially 
to the estimation and description of these relationships, rather than to that of the coe‑
fficients of the individual variables involved, that attention should be devoted. The 
idea is related to the identification of specific linkages that relate macro‑setting, insti‑
tutions, competencies and performances applying to different methodological analy‑
ses, which move from the evidence contained in the historical case studies to the gra‑
phical exercises introduced in the previous sections. It is important to bear in mind 
that within this context the representation proposed here can be considered as an ex‑
perimental approach, where the relationships of a certain kind between technical 
change and economic performance are being analyzed from a different perspective. 
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Thus, for example, on the one hand, the intuitive hypothesis that improvements in the 
efficiency of techniques of production or in product performances may be a determi‑
nant, or at least a binding precondition, of growth in per capita income and consump‑
tion should be more extensively investigated. On the other hand, in a dynamic pers‑
pective, we can introduce the debate about the question on whether institutions and 
competencies supporting technical change are sufficiently adaptive to adjust to whate‑
ver underlying economic change emerges from market interactions, or conversely, 
whether they are inertial enough to shape the rate of direction of innovation and eco‑
nomic performance. In a broad sense, the idea proposed here is aimed at maintaining 
the concept of NIS anchored at a “macro‑technological and institutional” container 
which enables an evaluation of innovative efforts and economic performance. 
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